Why Did Jesus Have To Die?

The early church primarily understood the question; why did Jesus have to die? -  in terms of overcoming the devil. In both the ransom and Christos Victor motif the purpose of the cross was to overcome Satin's lawful hold (because of the fall) over humanity.
 
In the ransom model God negotiates humanities freedom in return for Jesus' death while according to the Christos Victor motif Christ outwits the devil (Colossians 2) by dying an unlawful death (as he was innocent) rendering impotent Satan's claim over humanity. In both cases the problem is the same; namely the devil.

While these motif's provide a working mechanism they by no means address all the problems of the atonement. For example, both motif's require God respect an unspoken external decree. This idea is captured in C.S. Lewis's masterpiece - The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe - in which Aslan was only able to overcome the witch's claim over Edmond by taking advantage of the witches lesser understanding of "deep magic". The question which arises, of course, is how can an omni-God be held subservient to any such external decree?

In the eleventh century Anselm addressed this objection by suggesting the decree was not external but rather internal within God's own character. The problem was not so much the devil, but sin itself. 

In Anslem's penal substitution motif he reasons that because all men are sinful all are rightly sentenced by God to death. But because God is also love He instead sent Jesus to bear that punishment in our stead.

While this motif successfully addresses the difficulties of an external decree it faces new problems of its own. First the idea that guilt can be transferred from the guilty to the innocent simply contradicts just correspondence; ‘the person who sins is the one who will die. A son will not suffer for his father’s iniquity, and a father will not suffer for his son’s iniquity; the righteous person will be judged by his righteousness and the wicked person according to his wickedness (Ezekiel 18:20)’.

Second, penal substitution suggests that because of an internal decree God still had little choice in the matter; for He now had to demand and see satisfied a rightful penal sentence. But why should that be the case? Why can’t God just forgive the repentant? The prodigal son was not condemned for squandering the family inheritance but was embraced by his merciful father (who represents God) upon his return.

Third, although the penal substitution model gives context to Old Testament blood sacrifice as laid out in the Pentateuch it fails to explain the later attitude of the prophets;
 
'For I desire mercy, not sacrifice, and acknowledgment of God rather than burnt offerings. (Hosea 6:6).'

'I have more than enough of burnt offerings, of rams and the fat of fattened animals; I have no pleasure in the blood of bulls and lambs and goats (Isaiah 1:11).'

'With what shall I come to the LORD and bow myself before the God on high? Shall I come to Him with burnt offerings, With yearling calves? Does the LORD take delight in thousands of rams, In ten thousand rivers of oil? Shall I present my firstborn for my rebellious acts, The fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He has told you, O man, what is good; And what does the LORD require of you But to do justice, to love kindness, And to walk humbly with your God? (Micah 6:6-8).'

 
To progress this discussion first requires a resolution of the tension that exists between the Pentateuch that endorses animal sacrifice and the obvious distaste of blood sacrifice that we find in the prophets.
 
For Girard, all systems of sacrifice, whether pagan or Hebrew, can trace their origin to our earliest desires. Anthropologically speaking, human desire is both triangular and mimetic; mimetic in that it imitates; triangular in that any transaction is three cornered; first it involves a source (model) that stimulates the desire, secondly it involves a respondent (disciple) in whom the desire is implanted and third it involves the thing (object) that is desired[1].

Mimetic desire is simply this; humans want what others have. This is a deep, anthropological truth that is rooted in our evolutionary past. According to Girard, because humans want what others have, mimetic desire inevitably transitions from mimicry to rivalry (often violent) which destabilises the wider community.

History has shown us that these communities combated mimetic desire through the practice of scapegoating - ‘that is to say, an act of collective fratricide against a victim is foundational to all human cultures, with its being absolutely vital for the cultures so founded that they believe in the culpability of the rejected one (or group), and continue to bolster up this belief by forging prohibitions, myths and rituals’ [2].

The pertinent question for us is this - did scapegoating arise naturally in the Jewish tradition or was it uniquely decreed by God?

From a theological standpoint we can trace the origins of Israel's blood ritual back to  the stories of Adam and Eve - that is to say we can trace the origins of the blood ritual back to the mists of Israel's proto-history. According to the Genesis text the crafty serpent asks Eve an innocent enough question - can you not eat from any tree?

But rather than letting God respond she instead presumes to answer on God's behalf - as if He was not present. Theologically speaking, this conversation marks a subtle shift from intimacy as experienced in the garden to distance as would soon be experienced outside the garden. As Karl Bath points out the crafty serpent could not question God's true intentions while the relationship was intimate - while God was there. He needed a new context that distanced God.

Only once the suggestion of distance was established could the serpent begin to question God's intentions and in so doing erode the intimacy that had existed between God, Adam and Eve.
 
The narrative then goes on to describe several crisis points which mark the inevitable decay in intimacy and corresponding rise of self-sufficiency. Eve had granted the serpent context, as a result their banishment resulted in their having to work the land. Cain murdered Abel, as a result his banishment led his settling a city (higher level of self-sufficiency than working the land) and so forth.

One crises point that is specially relevant to this discussion is Cain and Abel's offering. It is noteworthy that God did not ask for a sacrifice - rather Cain and Abel chose to offer a sacrifice - perhaps to restore the favour that had been lost by their parents?

Many theologians point out that Cain's vegetarian offering displeased God while Abel's blood offering pleased God - and so conclude that only a blood sacrifice can satisfy God. By this reading God appears to be honouring a deeper decree (whether external of internal).

But this thesis is problematic - for if such a decree externally exists then the decree is higher than God because God is subservient to it - but by definition God cannot be subservient to anything higher than himself. A more convincing case can be made for an internal decree within God's own character - but even if granted we still have to explain (among other things) why the prophets, God's messengers, had a distaste for blood rituals.

Perhaps the more productive question is not why God rejected Cain's offering - but why God chose to accept Abel's offering? The answer, I believe, lays with the principle of accommodation. Right throughout the Old Testament we find examples where God accepts Israel's requests even though they were not consistent with God's own decrees (at least for a season).

For example, Samuel complained to God that Israel wanted a king and that they had rejected him as their prophet - but God makes it clear that Israel had not rejected Samuel - they had rejected Him. Nevertheless, even though Israel's request for a king represented Israel's rejection of YAWAH God still accommodates their wish.

The point is, if you pick up the story after this initial scene you might conclude that God was pro-kings; but this was obviously not the case  - rather God accommodated Israel's wish and so they got their kings.

In the same way, if we start the story of blood sacrifice with the Pentateuch we might conclude that God is pro blood sacrifice - but like the conclusion that God is pro-kings this conclusion is not warranted either. Rather what we find is a God who accommodates Abel's sacrifice because He found some redemptive value in it.

Similarly in Leviticus 17 God commands Moses to bring sacrifices to Him alone (an accommodation) so that the people would no longer offer sacrifices to goat idols (v 7).
 
In this way God's accommodation of pagan blood sacrifice solidified into the temple rituals that were laid down in the Pentateuch. It is noteworthy, however, that God's accommodation of pagan practices was transformed to preserve several important theological features.

For example, the Pentateuch describes how the priest would emerge through the temple veil (which represented the material world) after sacrificing a goat (which represented the LORD). Through this ceremony the Israelites understood that their God, in contrast to the pagan gods, did not need to be appeased because God was the one reaching out to Israel.
 
Moreover ritual animal sacrifice became synonymous with covenant. This explains, for example, the phrase 'to cut a covenant' which literally involved cutting an animal in half and walking between the two halves. The purpose of this ritual was to remind the participants that without covenant with the one living God their mortality would inevitably result in death (Romans 5:12).
 
In this way God accommodated Israel by melding scapegoating into a workable covenant. But over time the relationship that underpinned this accommodation was replaced by a more empty, worthless ritual that the prophets came to detest.

The covenant claimed 'the law requires that nearly everything be cleansed with blood and without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness (Hebrew 8: 22)'.
 
- which is why many theologians see blood as inextricably linked to God's forgiveness but the author of Hebrews wasn't defending the idea that God cannot forgive without blood - as if a deeper magic exists that God is subservient to - but rather the accommodation God gave Israel was fulfilled by Jesus' own blood sacrifice - which by its very nature bought an end to the economy of temple sacrifice.
 
Jesus did this by entering into the centre of what scapegoating had been covering up (self dependant act to remove our own guilt), in some sense Jesus entered the battlefield (Hebrews 2:14-15, 1 John 3:8) as our substitute to free us from the serpents 'distance' context that had ensnared all humanity.

The serpent's context had denied intimacy and promoted self-sufficiency which reinforces a mortal ontology (Romans 2:4). But through this one self-less act of solidarity (Mark 14:24, 1 Corinthians 11:25, Hebrews 7:22, 8:6, 9:15, Ephesians 5:2, Colossians 1:19-20) Jesus re-established the original trust context that existed between God and Adam - a context that confirms God is trustworthy and in turn His promise to overcome death is also trustworthy.

There is no external decree at play here, nor an internal decree in God's character that demands an innocent victim be sacrificed for the good of humanity. Rather the problem is and always has been our distrust of God's intentions - a perception that can no longer hold in the shadow of the cross. 

Alison succinctly sums up this thesis -  ‘Christianity is a priestly religion which understands that it is God’s overcoming of our violence by substituting himself for the victim of our typical sacrifices that opens up our being able to enjoy the fullness of creation as if death was not.[3]’.

 


[1] Girard’s breakthrough Alison J www.lamesalison.co.uk/tests/eng05.html
[2] ibid

[3] ibid
 

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