Phineas Gage in 1848 accidently triggered an explosion while leaning over a hole full of explosives. As a result a tamping iron went through his left eye, brain and skull. Damage to his ventral-medial frontal region transformed Gage from a conscientious citizen into a man with serious character flaws. This change in behaviour led De Waal[1] to conclude; ‘what this incident teaches us is that consciousness is not some disembodied concept that can be understood only on the basis of culture and religion’.
Gage may be the most famous example but he is certainly not unique[2]. Lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex in childhood have led to similar behavioural problems. Persons with schizophrenia lack the ownership of their own thoughts while patients suffering alien hand syndrome suffer involuntary actions. Volition disorders appear in patients suffering depression in which the inability to initiate new goal orientated activity is correlated to the inhibition in the brain’s frontal lobe and anterior cingulated cortex. FMRI imaging have also shown that the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus regions play a central role in moral appraisals demonstrating a neural substrate for the emotions by which we assign moral values to events, objects and actions.
Such neurobiological data lead Alan Torrance[3] to conclude that humans ‘are beings who grow and develop physically, emotionally, and intellectually, and in whom the latter seems intrinsically connected to the development of neurological componentry. We are also beings whose emotions are affected by chemical processes, whose moral consciences are soluble in alcohol, and whose mental processes degenerate with physical degeneration’.
Suppose there are two entities within a system (dualism), one material one not. The total energy of the system must include the sum of the energy of both entities if both contribute to reality. But the conservation of energy states that the energy of the system equals the energy of the material entity. Therefore the energy attributed to the non-material entity equals zero. In other words since the energy associated with the non-material aspect of the system is zero it cannot contribute to reality; either it is irrelevant or our dualistic hypothesis collapses into monism.
So most philosophers prefer to follow Spinoza who argues consciousness is a manifestation of the material substance. But how can such scientific consensus be squared against scripture, which according to Augustine, teaches dualism?
The English word soul is translated from the Hebrew word nephesh which in-turn means gullet or throat with the extended connotation of vitality and breath. When used anthropologically it refers to our entire being; ‘the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul (Genesis 2:7)’. Taken at face value, the author of Genesis here suggests both humanity and animals were created as souls; not with souls. These early monistic images are not missed in the wider Jewish literature;
'The belief that the soul continues its existence after the dissolution of the body is a matter of philosophical or theological speculation rather than of simple faith, and is accordingly nowhere expressly taught in Holy Scripture. As long as the soul was conceived to be merely a breath (‘nefesh’; ‘neshamah’; comp. ‘anima’), and inseparably connected, if not identified, with the life-blood (Gen. ix. 4, comp. iv. 11; Lev. xvii. 11; see Soul), no real substance could be ascribed to it. As soon as the spirit or breath of God (‘nishmat’ or ‘ruaḥ ḥayyim’), which was believed to keep body and soul together, both in man and in beast (Gen. ii. 7, vi. 17, vii. 22; Job xxvii. 3), is taken away (Ps. cxlvi. 4) or returns to God (Eccl. xii. 7; Job xxxiv. 14), the soul goes down to Sheol or Hades, there to lead a shadowy existence without life and consciousness (Job xiv. 21; Ps. vi. 6 [A. V. 5], cxv. 17; Isa. xxxviii. 18; Eccl. ix. 5, 10). The belief in a continuous life of the soul, which underlies primitive Ancestor Worship and the rites of necromancy, practised also in ancient Israel (I Sam. xxviii. 13 et seq.; Isa. viii. 19; see Necromancy), was discouraged and suppressed by prophet and lawgiver as antagonistic to the belief in Yhwh, the God of life, the Ruler of heaven and earth, whose reign was not extended over Sheol until post-exilic times (Ps. xvi. 10, xlix. 16, cxxxix. 8). As a matter of fact, eternal life was ascribed exclusively to God and to celestial beings who "eat of the tree of life and live forever" (Gen. iii. 22), whereas man by being driven out of the Garden of Eden was deprived of the opportunity of eating the food of immortality.[4]’
Thus the Old Testament is more consistent with monism than dualism. The New Testament also lacks explicit referents to the disembodied soul. In-fact several versus point in another direction - ‘He who is the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone possesses immortality (1 Timothy 6:15-16)’ while according to Paul the ‘perishable must put on the imperishable, and this mortal must put on immortality (1 Corinthians 15:53)’.
Yet some have argued that Paul defends the dualist conception of the soul in his second letter to the Corinthians - ‘for we know that if our earthly house, the tent we live in, is dismantled, we have a building from God, a house not built by human hands that is eternal in the heavens. For in this earthly house we groan, because we desire to put on our heavenly dwelling, if indeed, after we have put on our heavenly house, we will not be found naked. For we groan while we are in this tent, since we are weighed down, because we do not want to be unclothed, but clothed, so what is mortal is swallowed up by life. …. Thus we are full of courage and would prefer to be away from the body and at home with the Lord (2 Corinthians 5:1-8).’
This passage follows on from 1 Corinthians 15:35-38 in which Paul already affirmed 1) continuity from this life to the next; 2) current existence which is marked by frailty and so is unsuited to eternal life and; 3) our transformation into glorious bodies (see Philippians 3:21).
Paul makes the distinction between the soma psychikon and the soma pneumatikon. The first harks back to Genesis 2:7 in which Adam was a psychikos body. But his dusty body was susceptible to decay (Romans 5:12) and ill-suited to eternal life. Paul then compares the first Adam to the last spiritual Adam who is a life giving spirit (1 Corinthians 15:45). Here Paul is saying that we must experience transition from soma psychikon to soma pneumatikon if we are to become imperishable; ‘what is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable (1 Corinthians 15:43)’. Thus the transformation that results in non-perishable existence depends upon resurrection; and is not a characteristic inbuilt into our beings (dualism).
Read this way 2 Corinthians 5 simply contrasts an earthly tent that will be dismantled with a permanent heavenly home. Death is not the end of hope but the transition to an imperishable embodiment - being clothed in righteousness (see clothed in baptism - Romans 13:11-14) as contrasted to the fear of being found naked (moral shame see Isaiah 20:2-4, Ezekiel 23:28-29, Revelation 16:15).
Joel Green[5] thus concludes; ‘Paul’s focal concern is not with thanatology per se, but with resurrection hope. Importantly, both in 1 Corinthians 15 and in 2 Corinthians 5:1-10 he affirms that transformation and immortality are the consequence of resurrection. Although often read against the backdrop of body-soul dualism, and thus taken as further support for body-soul dualism, 2 Corinthians 5:1-10 actually points in a different direction. The dualism with which it is concerned is eschatological rather than anthropological. When read in conjunction with 1 Corinthians 15 (an interpretive move invited by the text itself), this passage thus provides no warrant for disembodied, human existence in an intermediate state.’
In sum no biblical text explicitly defends the conception of disembodied immortal souls. Instead the biblical data suggests that we are integrated mortal beings. But how does the mortal hypothesis, which endorses the severance of relationships and the fading of our personal narrative such that no part of personhood survives death, explain how our personhood is sustained from this life to the next?
According to Green[6] ‘belief in life-after-death requires embodiment – that is, re-embodiment. And this provides the basis for relational and narrative continuity of the self. It also begs the question, How are we capable of traversing from life to life after death? Simply put, we are not. The capacity for resurrection, for transformed existence, is not a property intrinsic to the human person (nor to the related cosmos). This is, as Paul emphasises God’s doing…..How then, is personal identity sustained from this world to the world to come? On the one hand Paul locates the answer to this problem under the category of mystery (1 Corinthians 15:51-57). On the other he hints at a relational ontology…….this suggests that the relationality and narrativity that constitutes who I am are able to exist apart from neural correlates and embodiment insofar as they are preserved in God’s own being, in anticipation of new creation’.
(For a detailed discussion on the implication of mortality click here).
The English word soul is translated from the Hebrew word nephesh which in-turn means gullet or throat with the extended connotation of vitality and breath. When used anthropologically it refers to our entire being; ‘the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul (Genesis 2:7)’. Taken at face value, the author of Genesis here suggests both humanity and animals were created as souls; not with souls. These early monistic images are not missed in the wider Jewish literature;
'The belief that the soul continues its existence after the dissolution of the body is a matter of philosophical or theological speculation rather than of simple faith, and is accordingly nowhere expressly taught in Holy Scripture. As long as the soul was conceived to be merely a breath (‘nefesh’; ‘neshamah’; comp. ‘anima’), and inseparably connected, if not identified, with the life-blood (Gen. ix. 4, comp. iv. 11; Lev. xvii. 11; see Soul), no real substance could be ascribed to it. As soon as the spirit or breath of God (‘nishmat’ or ‘ruaḥ ḥayyim’), which was believed to keep body and soul together, both in man and in beast (Gen. ii. 7, vi. 17, vii. 22; Job xxvii. 3), is taken away (Ps. cxlvi. 4) or returns to God (Eccl. xii. 7; Job xxxiv. 14), the soul goes down to Sheol or Hades, there to lead a shadowy existence without life and consciousness (Job xiv. 21; Ps. vi. 6 [A. V. 5], cxv. 17; Isa. xxxviii. 18; Eccl. ix. 5, 10). The belief in a continuous life of the soul, which underlies primitive Ancestor Worship and the rites of necromancy, practised also in ancient Israel (I Sam. xxviii. 13 et seq.; Isa. viii. 19; see Necromancy), was discouraged and suppressed by prophet and lawgiver as antagonistic to the belief in Yhwh, the God of life, the Ruler of heaven and earth, whose reign was not extended over Sheol until post-exilic times (Ps. xvi. 10, xlix. 16, cxxxix. 8). As a matter of fact, eternal life was ascribed exclusively to God and to celestial beings who "eat of the tree of life and live forever" (Gen. iii. 22), whereas man by being driven out of the Garden of Eden was deprived of the opportunity of eating the food of immortality.[4]’
Thus the Old Testament is more consistent with monism than dualism. The New Testament also lacks explicit referents to the disembodied soul. In-fact several versus point in another direction - ‘He who is the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone possesses immortality (1 Timothy 6:15-16)’ while according to Paul the ‘perishable must put on the imperishable, and this mortal must put on immortality (1 Corinthians 15:53)’.
Yet some have argued that Paul defends the dualist conception of the soul in his second letter to the Corinthians - ‘for we know that if our earthly house, the tent we live in, is dismantled, we have a building from God, a house not built by human hands that is eternal in the heavens. For in this earthly house we groan, because we desire to put on our heavenly dwelling, if indeed, after we have put on our heavenly house, we will not be found naked. For we groan while we are in this tent, since we are weighed down, because we do not want to be unclothed, but clothed, so what is mortal is swallowed up by life. …. Thus we are full of courage and would prefer to be away from the body and at home with the Lord (2 Corinthians 5:1-8).’
This passage follows on from 1 Corinthians 15:35-38 in which Paul already affirmed 1) continuity from this life to the next; 2) current existence which is marked by frailty and so is unsuited to eternal life and; 3) our transformation into glorious bodies (see Philippians 3:21).
Paul makes the distinction between the soma psychikon and the soma pneumatikon. The first harks back to Genesis 2:7 in which Adam was a psychikos body. But his dusty body was susceptible to decay (Romans 5:12) and ill-suited to eternal life. Paul then compares the first Adam to the last spiritual Adam who is a life giving spirit (1 Corinthians 15:45). Here Paul is saying that we must experience transition from soma psychikon to soma pneumatikon if we are to become imperishable; ‘what is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable (1 Corinthians 15:43)’. Thus the transformation that results in non-perishable existence depends upon resurrection; and is not a characteristic inbuilt into our beings (dualism).
Read this way 2 Corinthians 5 simply contrasts an earthly tent that will be dismantled with a permanent heavenly home. Death is not the end of hope but the transition to an imperishable embodiment - being clothed in righteousness (see clothed in baptism - Romans 13:11-14) as contrasted to the fear of being found naked (moral shame see Isaiah 20:2-4, Ezekiel 23:28-29, Revelation 16:15).
Joel Green[5] thus concludes; ‘Paul’s focal concern is not with thanatology per se, but with resurrection hope. Importantly, both in 1 Corinthians 15 and in 2 Corinthians 5:1-10 he affirms that transformation and immortality are the consequence of resurrection. Although often read against the backdrop of body-soul dualism, and thus taken as further support for body-soul dualism, 2 Corinthians 5:1-10 actually points in a different direction. The dualism with which it is concerned is eschatological rather than anthropological. When read in conjunction with 1 Corinthians 15 (an interpretive move invited by the text itself), this passage thus provides no warrant for disembodied, human existence in an intermediate state.’
In sum no biblical text explicitly defends the conception of disembodied immortal souls. Instead the biblical data suggests that we are integrated mortal beings. But how does the mortal hypothesis, which endorses the severance of relationships and the fading of our personal narrative such that no part of personhood survives death, explain how our personhood is sustained from this life to the next?
According to Green[6] ‘belief in life-after-death requires embodiment – that is, re-embodiment. And this provides the basis for relational and narrative continuity of the self. It also begs the question, How are we capable of traversing from life to life after death? Simply put, we are not. The capacity for resurrection, for transformed existence, is not a property intrinsic to the human person (nor to the related cosmos). This is, as Paul emphasises God’s doing…..How then, is personal identity sustained from this world to the world to come? On the one hand Paul locates the answer to this problem under the category of mystery (1 Corinthians 15:51-57). On the other he hints at a relational ontology…….this suggests that the relationality and narrativity that constitutes who I am are able to exist apart from neural correlates and embodiment insofar as they are preserved in God’s own being, in anticipation of new creation’.
(For a detailed discussion on the implication of mortality click here).
[1] Good Natured: The Origin of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals Waal Frans de. 1997 Harvard, pp. 216-217.
[2] Body, Soul and Human Life: The nature of humanity in the bible. Green J. B. 2008 Baker Academic
[2] Body, Soul and Human Life: The nature of humanity in the bible. Green J. B. 2008 Baker Academic
[3] As quoted: ‘From Cells to Souls –and beyond’ Malcolm Geeves 2004 Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co
[4] Immortality of the Soul: Jewish Encyclopaedia 1906
[5] Body, Soul and Human Life: The nature of humanity in the bible. Green J. B. 2008 Baker Academic
[6] Body, Soul and Human Life: The nature of humanity in the bible. Green J. B. 2008 Baker Academic
Peter, I cannot determine your own stance on continuity of the 'soul' from this narrative. Do you think your soul will continue in a new body?
ReplyDeleteWould we not say that continuity of the family traits, as one's own personality, is inherited through the genes in our DNA and by our upbringing?
Thanks for your question Guy. First up I think the idea of dualism untenable. Traditionally, the idea of the immortal soul leaving the physical body at the point of death to wait for resurrection is credited to the bible - but here I argue that this rendering is not Hebrew or even New Testament, but Greco-Roman. Instead both the Old and New Testaments teach that we are single integrated beings.
ReplyDeleteTherefore since we are mortal beings our family traits are certainly passed down by DNA, upbringing etc - here I entirely endorse the naturalistic thesis and the evolutionary processes involved. But the biblical story is not limited to this mortal description. It instead endorses an eternal eschatology. But theologically this subject is tricky, entangled in philosophical ideas. For example eternity is taken to mean timeless existence, not existing forever; otherwise we end up with such absurdum's as raised by Woody Alan - eternity is a long time, especially near the end.
But if the universe is a 4d block, then we are in some sense already eternal; it is just that we cannot perceive time that way (because time is a mind dependant illusion). Post mortem, since our minds on longer exist it follows that neither will the mind dependant illusion - so there are only two possibilities at that point 1) either we are no longer aware - but this is a temporal argument which holds less water in a block universe or 2) we simply experience this block universe anew; without mind dependant illusions - how this happens is a mystery, but it is by God's doing. Personally I hope the second option is true :)
There could be a problem for those who consider each soul to be unique yet to re-cycle due to the increasing number of persons on Earth. We either have to share a soul with our doppelganger else to create new ones with no past.
DeleteWe do have a third option to yours above for a 4D universe existing only at 'now': There is neither future nor past (except in the live-mind dependant illusion) if fundamental fermions exist only at 'now' as a displacement of one or two dimensions in the plane referenced / relative to D4, the so-called time dimension. This also explains how Relativity Theories hold good if all interactions between unique 4D 'quantum' particles are separated in space-time and carry charge differences by their various permutations of one or two spatial dimensions displaced on D4 and spatially separated by their spatial dimension/s sitting at 'now'.
We can also argue that the number of particles, comprised of fermions, may not change substantially in proportion to the number of minds or souls but that the particles and their atomic constructions are redistributed. I guess that describes reproductive life forms and their feeding habits with the function of increasing entropy to perpetuate the existence of our universe.
Wow, I'll have to dig out the physics books. In the mean time I think I will settle for the fact that the world has turned out to be far stranger than any of us supposed. Within these exotic discoveries lies the exciting possibility of new frontiers that will undoubtedly challenge not only how we think about physics but also how we think about metaphysics. Fascinating stuff.
DeleteOn your other comment I have not found the idea of soul re-cycling convincing because 1) it seems conceptually problematic and 2) the idea is not a biblical one. Happy to keep an open mind though, been wrong enough times to learn that lesson. Thanks for the comments :)
Thinking-about-physics IS meta-physics, is it not? ..... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics
ReplyDeletePoint taken
ReplyDelete